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Dickinson Law Review
framing of your careers. For me to descant on his
learning, or his intellectual force and brilliancy before
you would be foolish, as it would be to comment upon
his unusual ability to impart his knowledge to those
under him. I doubt if any of us in after years have had
any regret even for his disciplinary measures. But his
influence upon us was not limited to his teachings. The
example of a man of stainless integrity, of unremitting
industry, a liver of a noble, self-denying life, and a doer
of generous deeds, made unconsciously its impress on
us all. And I am glad that we have this public opportunity of acknowledging our obligation, and of repaying
it as far as it can be repaid, and, on this day and in this
way offering our tribute of profound regard and sincere
respect. It is most fitting that this building should
stand as a permanent monument to him and visualize a
real personality-one whom we love and honor, if we
did not obey, the Dean.
This building has been erected in a suitable place,
in a suitable manner, and has promise of use in continued
good service. It will aid in developing and broadening
other men, who in turn will go forth to leave their impress in the state, as you have done, and in after yearM.
you will be happy in the consciousness that you have
had your part in the training of the coming members
of that profession, of which we are all so proud.
ADDRESS OF JUSTICE EDWARD J. FOX OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
I feel greatly honored at being invited to speak on
this auspicious occasion as it is one in which I have a
very great interest. I am especially interested, and
have been for a great many years, in the work of legal
education. It was my very great pleasure in the early
history of the Pennsylvania State Bar Association to be
associated with Dean Trickett as a member of the Con-
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mittee of Legal Education. Before my elevation to the
Supreme Court, I was a member of that most unpopular
body, the State Board of Law Examiners, for a long
period of years and my interest, therefore, in legal education is a very deep and sincere one. I recognize what
splendid work the Dickinson School of Law has done.
Both the Law School and Dickinson College have an esChief
tablished place in the history of the nation.
Justice Roger B. Taney is a graduate of the law school,
and Dickinson also gave to the country James Buchanan,
President of the United States, and a long line of distinguished men who have been educated in the law here.
When Dean Trickett wrote me inviting me to come
here with the modesty that is thoroughly characteristic
of him, he did not indicate in any way that the hall to
be dedicated was known as Trickett Hall, but simply
wrote me that it was to be the dedication of "a Hall."
He did not indicate either just what topic I should treat
in my address, but left that entirely to my discretion,
and I confess that I am somewhat embarrassed to determine just what should be my thought on this occasion.
I have too recently become a member of the highest appellate court of the state to feel that I am qualified to speak for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
but the limited experience which I have already had upon the Bench indicates to me that the work is most interesting, and at the same time I may say that this experience teaches me that you gentlemen who are members of the Bar should feel that the court wishes to
have all the assistance that it can from the members
of the Bar. I recall an anecdote told by Chief Justice
White of the Supreme Court of the United States which,
while it illustrates what I mean, perhaps goes further
than is necessary. The Chief Justice said that upon one
occasion a young lawyer from Virginia was arguing a
case in the Supreme Court of the United States and he
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was proceeding to state with great precision a number
of very elementary principles of law. Finally the Chief
Justice interrupted him and said, "Mr. -,
do you not
think it safe to assume that the members of the Supreme Court of the United States have some knowledge of the elementary principles of law?", when the
counsel interrupted and said, "No Sir, that is just the
mistake which I made in the lower court."
Before proceeding to discuss what I have in mind,
there is one matter in connection with the appellate
courts of Pennsylvania to which I would like to refer,
and I trust that what I say will not be misunderstood or
misinterpreted. The events of the past few weeks have
served to draw my attention particularly to this fact, and
with the profession so largely represented in this gathering, I feel that it is an opportune time to suggest to
them this thought in the hope that they will do what
they can to rectify what I believe is a serious misapprehension in the mind of the public. I believe that the
ordinary business man and citizen of Pennsylvania has
comparatively little interest in the personnel of the appellate courts. When it comes to the election of a local
judge they will probably know personally the candidates
who are presented and they are sufficiently interested
to vote at the election for a local judge. But when the
question involved is the election of a judge to the appellate court they do not know the men who are candidates, and they either do not vote at all or vote blindly for the first or last man on the ticket, and content
themseves with the discharge of their duties as a citizen in that way. I talked recently with a man who said
to me that although he had lived in Easton for ten years
he had never registered as a voter, and he seemed completely indifferent not only to the judicial elections but
to all elections, and I endeavored to point out to him
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how vitally he was interested in the members of the appellate court.
Out of the large number of men convicted of crimes
in our court every year there must of necessity be a considerable percentage of innocent men convicted.
My
friend had never stopped to reflect upon this, and in order to bring the argument home I said to him, "Suppose
you are charged with some serious crime, and while the
circumstances are such that they indicate your guilt,
you know that you are innocent of the crime charged.
You are tried in the lower court and you are convicted
unjustly. You wish to take every opportunity of setting aside that conviction and you take an appeal to
the appellate court. The appellate court is composed
of seven judges. Suppose the court divides as to the
propriety of the conviction by a vote of four to three.
One man therefore determines your fate." I think my
friend realized after this presentation of the matter
that he was interested in the composition of the appellate court and the citizens of Pennsylvania are all interested and they cannot tell when they will be vitally
and personally affected by the decision. I feel, therefore, -like urging upon this body of lawyers that they
engage in a campaign of education. I venture to say
that few business men in Pennsylvania can name the
Chief Justice of Pennsylvania. The Secretary of the
Board of Trade of my home town who is a man of education and intelligence was in my office recently and I
asked him if he knew who the Chief Justice was, and he
was unable to tell me. And this is not a singilar experience but one which I think can be duplicated in any
town.
I would like to direct your attention for a few moments, however, to some popular fallacies that exist as
to the profession of law and lawyers. That they are
fallacies there can be no question, and that a prejudice
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does exist in the community against lawyers is equally
true. Long ago, Jack Cade exclaimed, "First let us kill
all the lawyers," and this simply typifies the sentiment that still exists in large part among the people
generally, namely, that lawyers are not to be trusted,
and that they are untruthful and that in many ways
they are unworthy of confidence. Some years ago a
good old lady inquired about a young man just leaving
college, and when she was told that he was about to enter the profession of the law, she expressed great surprise and dismay because she was under the impression
that he had intended to enter the ministry, and endeavored to sustain her attitude by saying that her father
had originally intended to study law and when he was
converted to Christianity he found that it was impossible for him to be a lawyer, and then he entered the
ministry. I think this impression lies only on the surface, and that really, as lawyers all know, there are constant instances in which the people at large manifest
their confidence in the profession.
One of the fallacies is that the term "lawyer" is
synonomous to "liar." We all know that this is not true.
As long ago as in the Statutes of Edward III, it was a
penal offense for any servant to indulge in deceit, and
the penalty was a year's imprisonment.
In no other
profession except the clerical profession is there any vow
or oath taken, but when the lawyer begins his practice,
he swears not only to support the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of Pennsylvania but
also that "he will use no falsehood and that he will delay
no man's cause for malice or lucre." I have had a long
experience at the Bar and I am glad to say that
in that long experience I have encountered comparatively few instances in which a lawyer's word could not be
absolutely depended upon. It is the constant practice
of the courts to recognize the unsworn statement of a

16

Dickinson Law Review

lawyer as absolute verity. One of the reasons which
perhaps gives rise to this impression is the fact that
in the trial of cases the lawyer is engaged in an attempt to elicit the truth, and instead of recognizing this
fact, the public believes that the effort is made to obscure or hide the truth and to bring out only facts that
will assist the particular litigant. I believe that most
witnesses on the stand intend to tell the truth, and yet
in a great many instances, without intending to do so,
they are guilty of perverting and distorting the truth
to a very great extent. This is due to the fact that a
1 itness is obli.ed to exercise
not only his mem'ory
but his powers of observation. We all know how fallacious human memory is, but I think we do not all appreciate fully how little we exercise our powers of observation. Did you ever make the experiment of walking by
a show window in a department store, noticing the articles in the window and then determining after you left
how many of them you can write down or call to memory? This simply illustrates the fact that we are all
of us prone to make inaccurate observations and the
result is that when it becomes a matter of testimony
in court, it is difficult to give accurate testimony because of the lack of accurate observation. The' art of
examination and of cross-examination, if I may so speak,
is a perfectly legitimate method to use for the purpose
of eliciting the truth. It may aid the honest witness by
developing his knowledge, and it is equally true that the
dishonest witness ought to be exposed. I recall an instance that occurred in the trial of 'a case in our local
courts when Judge Scott was the cross examiner. A
witness was undertaking to tell that he had delivered a
certain number -of loads of wood, and he gave the days
and dates on which the deliveries had been made. Judge
Scott, with an account book in his hand, induced this
witness who was not frank and truthful, to testify that
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he had delivered the wood on a large number of days
when there had been no actual deliveries and the witness was misled simply because he believed that the entries were made in the book which Judge Scott held in
his hands.
There were no such entries and the witness was completely discredited when Judge Scott came
to make his address to the jury.
Another fallacy with regard to our profession is
that a lawyer is constantly defending people whom he
knows to be guilty and that this is discreditable. I have
not been in the criminal courts for a good many years
so far as the active trial of cases is concerned, but I have
kept in close, touch with them and I think I know whereof I speak when I say that so far as my experience goes
it is a very rare experience for a lawyer to know that a
client is actually guilty of a crime, and when he does discover this he usually advises that the client shall plead
guilty.
There is nothing discreditable in using your
knowledge of the law and your skill as a practitioner in
defending a man who is accused of crime. There is always a possibility that he may be innocent and it is his
constitutional privilege to be defended by one who is
learned in the law and there should be no criticism for
this reason. In the trial of Queen Caroline, Lord
Broughham thus states his conception of his duty to
the client," "I once took occasion to remind your Lordships, which was unnecessary, but there are many
whom it may be needful to remind, that an advocate by
the sacred duty which he owes to his client, knows in
the discharge of that office but one person in the world, that client and none other. To save that client by all
expedient means, to protect that client at all hazards
and costs to all others, and among others to himself,
is the highest and most unquestioned of his duties; and
he must not regard the alarm, the suffering, the torment, the distraction which he may bring upon any
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other, nay, separating even the duty of a patriot from
those of an Advocate. He must go on reckless of consequence if his fate it should unhappily be to involve
his country in confusion for his client's protection."
This is perhaps an exaggerated statement of the
duty which a lawyer owes to his client, and indeed Lord
Brougham subseq71ently confessed that the statement
which was made was partially for the infuence which
he hoped it would exercise upon the King, but, nevertheless, the real basis of the relation which all lawyers
sustain to clients is contained in this excerpt.
Another fallacy is that lawyers are not to be
trusted. It is constantly exemplified in our practice
that our clients and the people generally do not really
feel in this way. A client will confide in his counsel
the most sacred family secrets which he would not
divulge to any other person. He will commit his interests wholly and absolutely to the care and custody
of his counsel in a way that exhibits the greatest posHe will deposit securities that he
sible confidence.
Would not leave with the banker under similar circumstances without the most careful receipts. If you will
pardon a personal illustration, I recall that some years
ago I was enjaged in a litgation with reference to a
divorce in New York where, in order to effect a set.tlement, it became- necessary for my clieit and his
wife, who were the parties to the divorce proceedings,
to make a conveyance of a large amount of real estate to me. -The deeds ,were- executed and to my
amazement wlfen I proposed that I should give some
indication of 'the fact that I held this property only in
trust, my 'client demurred and said that it was totally
unnecessAry. 'Of course-I was ,unwilling to permit the
mattert'stand in that way, but it exemplified the
thought that I have in n'find that our'clients are consian-fly entrusting to our'care substantiar intere'sts with
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absolute confidence that their trust will not be abused.
Again there is the popular idea that lawyers are
not a hardworking profession, that their money is made
easily and that they grossly overcharge for their services. There are so many practicing lawyers here present today that it seems idle to say that this is a -fallacy. The work of the legal profession is most exacting
and onerous.
The constant multiplication of reports
is one item alone that illustrates the immense amount
of labor involving in keeping up with the work of the
profession. We have almost 260 volumes of Pennsylvania State Reports and a large number of Superior Court
reports, not to mention the United States Reports, and
the reports of other states to which resort must constantly be had in aid of the successful work of the practicing lawyer. A lawyer's work is never done.
He
may be engaged in the trial of a case during the entire
day and perhaps nervously and physically. exhauste!d
from the work and yet he must go to his office and
prepare for the continuance of the work of the next
day by unremitting toil, industry and study. The compensation which he receives for work of this kind is
not excessive and is often inadequate, and it has been
my experience that most lawyers are absoldtely honest
and fair in their endeavors to make the charges proper
and satisfactory.
I have thus briefly indicated some fallacies that
obtain as to our profession. The legal profession is a
glorious one and we must see to it that there is nothing
done that will tend in the slightest degree to tarnish it
or take away the lustre to which it is properly entitled.
I am very glad to participate in the ceremonies attending upon the dedication of this Hall to Dean Trickett,
and think that it is fitting that the Hall should be so
named. Dean Trickett can well exclaim "exegi monunentum aere perennius."
He has indeed erected a
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monument more lasting than bronze in the hearts of
men who have gone out from this splendid school of
law. You who have sat there at the feet of this Gamaliel have enjoyed a rare privilege and which I can well
see you all prize most highly. If we wish to keep the
lustre of our profession untarnished, may all of us, both
you and I, mould our professional lives upon this life of
the great teacher here who is so eminent and so justly
distinguished in the world of legal education as a Master in the profession.
ADDRESS OF DR. GEORGE EDWARD REED, FORMERLY PRESIDENT OF DICKINSON COLLEGE
AND OF THE DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW
Mr. Chairman, Dean Trickett, Alumni of the
School, Ladies and Gentlemen:
Invited by the distinguished Dean of the School 'to
be present at the occasion of the celebration of the
twenty-eighth anniversary of the founding of the Dickinson School of Law, together with the dedication of
the superb building, one of the finest in the land-in
which we are now assembled, to the purpose for which
it was designed, and to make a brief address, I very
gladly consented, both because of my high regard for
Dean Trickett and my deep interest for many years in
the building up and success of the school.
The accomplished lawyer and jurist-Mr. Justice
Fox, of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in opening
his address, stated that the Dean of the School had
suggested to him a brief address.
The Dean's invitation to me was much more specific, namely, that I should speak about fifteen minutes. In urging this time limitation I am confident
he had a vivid memory of the twenty-two interminable
baccalaureates to which for twenty-two years he wear-

